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DUNCAN, GORDON

Reforming Japan: Measuring the Success of
the Allied Occupation’s Economic,
Educational, and Constitutional Reforms	
  

	
  
Following the surrender of Japan on September 2 of 1945, American
forces occupied Japan in an attempt to remove Japan’s ability to wage
aggressive war. From 1945 to 1952, Occupation authorities in Tokyo under
General Douglas MacArthur undertook a number of reforms intended to
‘demilitarize’ and ‘democratize’ Japan, some of which left major structural
changes to the pre-war Japanese system. This thesis will focus on three reforms:
the dissolution of Japan’s zaibatsu (large industrial conglomerates such as
Nissan), democratization of the education system, and Article IX of Japan’s
Constitution which bans Japan from possessing military forces. I analyze the
success of each reform through the end of the Cold War by examining if their
purpose and structure has remained in place. 	
  
By 1947 events on the world stage, including the routing of U.S. ally
Chiang Kai-Shek’s forces in China, by Mao Zedong’s communist forces, and the
rapid emergence of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, became issues of
immediate concern among American policymakers. In Japan, continuing
economic troubles including inflation and high unemployment lead to the rise of
powerful labor movements that were increasingly linked to communists. In light of
these events, conservatives in the United States Government and conservatives
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in the Japanese government joined forces to reverse some of the early reforms
hoping to create a stable country free from communist influence.	
  
Beginning in 1948, both the structure and purpose of the zaibatsu reforms
were undermined as the U.S. withdrew support for the Occupation’s economic
reforms, after which the conglomerates again dominated the Japanese economy.
While the Ministry of Education began to regain centralized control of the
education system in the 1950s, many structural changes remained in place such
as teachers Unions; in addition, pacifist curriculums continue to be an important
legacy of the Occupation. Finally, Article IX of Japan’s constitution has faced
large challenges after independence, however, it has remained unamended 70
years later, and further, during this time Japan has not fought a war. I will argue
that the education reforms and Article IX were successful because of widespread
popular support while the zaibatsu reforms failed due to lack of popular support
and Cold War Pressures to stabilize the economy. 	
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Introduction
First destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build
the structure of representative government. Modernize the
constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise the women.
Release the political prisoners. Liberate the farmers.
Establish a free labor movement. Encourage free economy.
Abolish police Oppression. Develop a free and responsible
press. Liberalize education. Decentralize political power.
Separate church from state. These tasks were to occupy me
for the next five years and more. All were eventually
accomplished, some easily, some with difficulty.
 General Douglas MacArthur, 
Reminiscences
, 1964.
Following the surrender of Japan on September 2 of 1945, the United States
faced a monumental task: rebuilding a nation utterly destroyed by war, physically,
spiritually, and economically. Today, Japan boasts the world’s third largest economy by
1

2

GDP, a robust democracy, an education system that ranks among the highest in the
3

4

world each year, and it has not fought a war since 1945. Japan did not become the
nation it is today solely on its own. The country owes a large deal of credit to the United
States Occupation for shaping the new laws and institutions of the postwar era. The
Japanese people too deserve credit for their resilient spirit and dedication to rebuilding a
country devastated by firebombs, atomic weapons, and hunger. While many Japanese
and many in the international community are aware that there was an American
Occupation of Japan from 19451952, there is little awareness of the specific reforms
implemented during the Occupation or the effects that they had after the Occupation
1

"Gross Domestic Product 2014," The World Bank, February 17, 2016, Accessed February 22, 2016,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf
.
2
David Pilling, "Democracy Is Robust in Asia," 
Financial Times
, April 28, 2010, Accessed February 22,
2016, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2abe228c52f811df813e00144feab49a.html#axzz40q4c7HND.
3
Pearson, "Education and Skills for Life," The Learning Curve, Accessed January 19, 2016,
http://thelearningcurve.pearson.com/2014reportsummary/
.
4
Philip A. Seaton, 

Japan's Contested War Memories: The 'Memory Rifts' in Historical Consciousness of
World War II
(Routledge, 2007), 6.

1

ended. This thesis will focus on three reforms: the dissolution of Japan’s 
zaibatsu
(large
industrial conglomerates such as Nissan), the democratization of the education system,
and the implementation of Article IX of Japan’s Constitution which bans Japan from
possessing offensive military forces. I analyze the success of each reform through the
end of the Cold War by examining if their original purpose and structure has remained in
place. I will argue that the education reforms and Article IX were successful because of
widespread popular support, while the 
zaibatsu
reforms failed due to lack of popular
support, and Cold War pressures to stabilize the economy.
The key objectives of the Occupation under General Douglas MacArthur,
Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), were the ‘democratization’ and
5

‘demilitarization’ of Japan. The basic principles of these objectives began with the
Potsdam Declaration, a joint declaration issued on July 26, 1945 by President Harry S.
Truman, President Chiang KaiShek (Nationalist Party of China), and Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, that outlined the terms of Japan’s imminent surrender. After Japan
surrendered on November 3, 1945, an official order called “Basic Initial Post Surrender
Directive” was sent to General Douglas MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the
6

authority of President Truman. Both the Potsdam Declaration, and the Post Surrender
Directive, to a more detailed degree, outlined the economic, military, and political goals
for the occupation. Japan was to be a democratic nation with a free economy, a nation
disarmed with its ability to wage war removed.

Tōgō Kazuhiko, Japan’s Foreign Policy 19452003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy
(Boston: Leiden,
2005), 36.
6
"113 Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Basic Initial PostSurrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan," November 1, 1945." National Diet Library. Accessed
January 19, 2016. http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/036shoshi.html.
5

2

MacArthur’s Headquarters, known as GHQ, “ruled” Japan “beyond challenge or
7

criticism.” They did so through a powerful hierarchy, among themselves and above the
8

Japanese government. However, while MacArthur and his staff controlled the direction
of the reforms, they relied on the Japanese to implement the changes. This was
necessary because the Occupation forces had no linguistic or cultural knowledge of
Japan for the most part, and had to make use of Japanese government structures
9

already in place. The American agenda was in general heavily inspired by “liberal New
Deal attitudes, labor reformism, and Bill of Rights idealism” that was losing support in
10

the United States according to historian John Dower. Many of the reforms envisioned
to ‘democratize’ Japan would have seemed “extreme” if introduced in the United States
at the time, says Dower, but they were possible because of SCAP’s authoritarian rule.

11

By 1947, events on the world stage, including the routing of U.S. ally Chiang
KaiShek’s forces in China by Mao Zedong’s communist forces, and the rapid
emergence of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, became issues of immediate
concern among American policymakers. In Japan, continuing economic troubles
including inflation and high unemployment led to the rise of powerful labor movements
that were increasingly linked to communists. In light of these events, conservatives in
the United States government and conservatives in the Japanese government joined

John W. Dower,
Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II,
1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton
& Co./New Press, 1999), 27.
8
Dower, 
Embracing Defeat
, 27.
9
Dower, 
Embracing Defeat
, 27.
10
Dower, 
Embracing Defeat,26.
11
Dower, 
Embracing Defeat,2627.
7

3

forces to reverse some of the early reforms, hoping to create a stable country free from
communist influence.
In the years immediately after the War, the Occupation favored progressive, left
of center parties; in addition, its political purge undertaken in January 1946 removed
more than 70 percent of politicians who had been members of the Diet before 1945,
12

most of whom had been conservatives. While this development was a blow to the
conservatives, they have consistently remained at the head of the Japanese
Government since 1945. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), established in October 1945,
peaked in 1947 when they won 143 seats in the Lower House versus the Liberals 132
13

seats and the Democrats 126 seats; however, they were unwilling to form a coalition
14

or compromise on their ideological stances and were unable to enact much change. In
addition, it was unable to deal with the increasingly militant labor movement and the
15

ongoing food shortage. Conservative Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru held the position
of Prime Minister from May 22, 1946 – May 24, 1947 as the leader of the Liberal Party,
and then again from October 15, 1948 – December 10, 1954 as the leader of
16

DemocraticLiberal Party [which in 1950 merged with the Liberal party]. While the
Socialists saw some success in 1947, during the 1950s they faced a full on assault from
conservatives in the Japanese government.

Louis D. Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics.4th ed. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 8990.
Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics,90.
14
Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics,91.
15
Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics,91.
16
"Prime Ministers in History,"
Prime Minister and His Cabinet,Accessed January 26, 2016,
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/cabinet/003160_e.html
.
12
13

4

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was officially organized in 1955 through a
combination of two conservative parties, the Liberal and Democratic parties, but can
17

trace its lineage as far back as the 1870s. The party formed out of concern on the part
of the business community and for good relations with Washington and in reaction to
the intensifying demands from organized labor; in light of the pressures from the left and
organized labor, unity among the two conservative parties was seen as a way of
18

promoting government stability.

Ideologically, the party stresses a centralized efficient government with an
important role in the economy; it does not favor strong local initiatives but receives
19 

broad public support due to its commitment to strong economic development.

Its

ideology substitutes and economic definition of security for a military one; its foreign
policy has been proWestern and anti communist, however it was willing to trade with
20

the Soviet Union and China from the start. The party maintains close ties to business,
especially large corporations and in return receives massive amount of funds that keep
21

it strong. The LDP has been in a commanding position since their formation in 1955;
after a brief loss of power in 1993 in which unstable coalition governments superseded
22

its power, the LDP regained power once again. Today, the LDP is still in power under,
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics,73.
Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics,7374.
19
Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics,74.
20
Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics,74.
21
Hayes, 
Introduction to Japanese Politics,74.
22
Hayes, 

Introduction to Japanese Politics,6970.
17
18

5

In 19471948, the Truman Administration initiated a recovery program in Japan
23

modeled after the Marshall Plan, which put it at odds with General MacArthur. And the
State Department and Defense Department, in addition, halted many Occupation
24

reforms in order to pursue economic recovery and stability in Japan. This change in
policy was known as the “Reverse Course.” On top of these changes at home,
MacArthur became increasingly concerned with communism inside Japan. What
followed was the “Red Purge.” The Red Purge was a series of layoffs, often considered
arbitrary, according to historians John Dower and Hirata Tetsuo, that were carried out
from 1949 to 1951 by Japanese government agencies and corporations; the layoffs
were aimed at eliminating workers who were branded as communist, whether actually
members of the party or not; the Purge included, for instance, leftwing democrats and
25

laborunion activists. Working together with conservatives in the Japanese
government, MacArthur silenced leftist elements in all walks of life. While the
Occupation had originally supported democracy, liberty, and freedom of speech, such
26

concepts were quickly diluted in favor of strategic expediency. Critics in Japan who
27

accused GHQ of imperialism or rationed democracy were silenced. And the
28

conservatives’ firm grip on power was secured with GHQ’s blessing. In addition,
ultranationalists and militarists formally banned from positions of authority were

Schaller, 
The American Occupation of Japan,ix.
Schaller, 
The American Occupation of Japan,ix.
25
John W. Dower, and Hirata Tetsuo, "Japan's Red Purge: Lessons from a Saga of Suppression of Free

Speech and Thought," 
The Asia Pacific Journal
, (5) (7) (July 3, 2007): 3.
26
Toshio Nishi, 
Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 19451952
(Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1982), 3.
27
Toshio Nishi, 
Unconditional Democracy
, 3.
28
Toshio Nishi, 
Unconditional Democracy
, 3.
23
24

6

29

welcomed back. Because of this, some question whether any of the reforms were truly
successful.
In his book 
Aftermath of War: Americans the Remaking of Japan, 19451952
,
historian Howard B. Schonberger argues that in 1952, when the Occupation ended, the
United States had “superficially accomplished its goals in Japan.”

30

Even then,

however, Schonberger highlights the success of Article IX. The “nowar” clause of
Japan’s constitution continued to be embraced by the Japanese people even as the
United States set about attempting to rearm the nation, he says.

31

Schonberger

suggests that it was American policymakers, backed by large American corporations,
who pushed aside those who called for deep reforms needed to bring about a peaceful
democracy in Japan.

32

By the end of the Occupation, Schonberger says, the economic

and political elites in Japan maintained power under a constitutional monarchy and
33

accepted their new position in the “American dominated system of global capitalism.”

Historian Toshio Nishi argues, in his book 
Unconditional Democracy: Education
and Politics in Occupied Japan, 19451952
, that while the Japanese people had to
“swallow many alien ideas and practices,” far from being “unpalatable,” the Japanese
34

people found some of them “downright appetizing.” When the American Occupation
ended in 1952, many of the reforms had already formed a basis for a new political

Toshio Nishi, 
Unconditional Democracy
, 3.
Howard B.
Schonberger, 

Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945 1952
(Kent,
Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), 279.
31
Schonberger, 
Aftermath of War
, 279.
32
Schonberger, 
Aftermath of War
, 284.
33
Schonberger, 
Aftermath of War
, 284285.
34
Toshio Nishi, 
Unconditional Democracy
, 297.
29
30

7

35 

culture.

The Japanese people as a whole, Nishi claims, did not break down because

of “American mass democracy,” but instead found democracy to be “a pleasant,
36

efficient, and even commercially profitable way of life.” As opposed to Schonberger,
Nishi views the Occupation as beneficial not just for the economic and political elites,
but for all Japanese. I will show that the Japanese people as a whole did benefit, as
Schonberger claims, and that they embraced democratic reforms wholeheartedly. This
wholehearted embracement of democratic reforms proved itself through widespread
resistance to attempts by the U.S. government and Japanese conservatives to
undermine aspects of the education reforms and Article IX beginning in the late 1940s.
In his book 
Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II
, historian John
Dower argues that despite the “ultimate emergence of a conservative postwar state, the
ideals of peace and democracy took root in Japan—not as a borrowed ideology or
37 

imposed vision, but as a lived experience and a seized opportunity.”

Dower’s

argument follows that although the Americans reversed course on their original
“rootandbranch agenda” of demilitarization and democratization, an agenda he terms
both “selfrighteous” and visionary, Japan’s position as a Cold War partner, rearmed
and with many reforms reversed, did not prevent it from becoming the democratic and
38

peaceful nation it is today. When they arrived, the American forces found a people
“sick of war, contemptuous of the militarists” who had caused them hardship, and who
39

wished to both “forget the past and to transcend it.”

Toshio Nishi, 
Unconditional Democracy
, 297.
Toshio Nishi, 
Unconditional Democracy
, 297.
37
Dower, 
Embracing Defeat,23.
38
Dower, 
Embracing Defeat,23.
39
Dower, 
Embracing Defeat,24.
35
36

8

I disagree with Schonberger that the American reforms were “superficial,” and, I
think he makes an important point that Article IX has proven to be a successful and
widely embraced reform. And I agree with both Dower and Nishi that Japan has
embraced democracy and peace, democratization and demilitarization. I think it is
important to examine each reform individually as some have been more successful than
others, and while some have stood the test of time, others have not.
I would like to look at three reforms: the dissolution of Japan’s 
zaibatsu
,
democratization of the education system, and Article IX of Japan’s Constitution which
bans Japan from possessing offensive military forces. Each of these specific reforms
were part of the larger series of reforms encompassing the Japanese economy,
educational world, and political structure, that were intended to dismantle militarism and
put in its place a democratic and peaceful Japan that would never again pose a threat to
world peace. I will argue that the education reforms and Article IX were successful
because of widespread popular support while the 
zaibatsu
reforms failed due to lack of
popular domestic support and Cold War pressures to stabilize Japan’s economy.
I will first give a brief history of the three reforms. I will then measure the level of
success of each reform through the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, and will
briefly touch on where each reform stands today. In terms of methods, I will look at key
policy directives and other government documents that helped to shape the course of
the American Occupation in order to established purpose and structure. Primary
sources will also include firsthand accounts of the reforms given by key figures such as
Former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and General MacArthur, how they viewed the

9

Occupation reforms, and how they determined success. I will then look at key periods
during which specific reform measures were challenged or reversed. I also believe that
it is extremely important to give insight into public sentiment and how the success or
lack of success reflected in the United States and Japanese media. Finally, because
each reform that I look at has powerful implications for today’s Japan, I will briefly
examine how the reforms stand in the 2000s.
The first reform that I will focus on is the dissolution of the 
zaibatsu
, Japan’s large
industrial conglomerates. In 1945, just ten of the large conglomerates controlled nearly
40

fiftypercent of the Japanese economy. The conglomerates were credited with helping
to support militarists in the wartime Japanese government in order to profit from
imperialist ventures such as the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. The Occupation
administration also believed that powerful business interests would interfere with their
goals of building a healthy democratic system free from the overarching influence of
wealthy Japanese elites. Beginning in 1945, MacArthur and the Occupation forces set
about to dismantle the 
zaibatsu
and liberalize the Japanese economy under a directive
from President Truman. However, by the end of 1948, the reforms were reversed. I will
argue in this chapter that the 
zaibatsu
reforms were unsuccessful because the
Japanese economy continued to struggle and because popular support in Japan, and
more importantly the United States, turned against the reforms. I will show that both the
structure and purpose of the 
zaibatsu
reforms were undermined as a result of new U.S.

40

Dower, 
Embracing Defeat,530.

10

administered economic policy that supported big business and economic stabilization
over democratization.
The second reform I will focus on is the reform of the Japanese education
system. There is little debate amongst scholars that education played a crucial role in
supporting the indoctrination of young Japanese into the principles of Japanese
nationalism and that such education helped fuel militarism up to and during World War
II. The shape and structure of Japan’s education system today owes much to the
reforms the Occupation undertook beginning in 1945. In determining the success of
these reforms, I will examine key documents including the “The Report of The United
States Education Mission,” a group sent by the State Department in March of 1946 to
help SCAP develop a comprehensive plan for reforms. I argue that the education
reforms were successful as a result of widespread popular support and that they have
outlasted pressures of recentralization in part due to the introduction of teachers’
unions.
Third, I will examine Article IX of Japan’s Constitution, which renounces war and
prevents Japan from waging another war of aggression, promulgated on November 3,
1946. It essentially banned Japan from possessing land, air, or sea forces. In a
dangerous world and with an uncertain future, such a provision was from its inception
somewhat problematic for Japan. Quite simply, all nations possess some form of
military for defense from outside forces or from large internal conflicts. Cold War threats
and current efforts by conservatives in the Japanese government have challenged
Japanese pacifism. However, I will argue that Article IX was successful because of

11

widespread popular support that continues through to this day. Article IX of Japan’s
constitution has faced large challenges after independence, however, it has remained
unamended 70 years later, and further, during this time Japan has not fought a war. In
analyzing the success of the Occupational reforms, I will examine Article IX of the
Japanese Constitution, The U.S.Japan Mutual Security Agreement (effective in 1952),
and The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and
Japan (1960). I will then examine the various challenges to Article IX that have taken
place in the past 70 years.
This paper will focus on three Occupation reforms including: the dissolution of
Japan’s 
zaibatsu
, the reform of the education system, and the implementation of Article
IX. I will show that the reforms of the 
zaibatsu
failed due to Cold War pressures and
because of the close relationship between the economic elites and political elites,
zaibatsu
leadership and political leadership. I will then analyze why reforms to education
were successful, I will show that while the Ministry of Education began to regain
centralized control of the education system in the 1950s, many structural changes
remained in place such as teachers’ unions; in addition, pacifist curriculums continue to
be an important legacy of the Occupation. Finally I will show that like the education
reforms, Article IX was successful due to widespread popular support that has ensured
it has remained unamended since its creation 70 years ago. I will measure the success
of each reform through the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s by examining if their
purposes and structures have remained in place, and will briefly touch on where each
reform stands today.

12

Chapter I: Reform of Industry
In the wake of World War II, Japan was left smoldering, starving, and
demoralized. It was under these conditions that GHQ (General Headquarters) under
General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), was tasked
with rebuilding a destroyed nation and dismantling the structures in Japanese society
and government that had led Japan to militarism in the first place. Ten large business
conglomerates known as 
zaibatsu
controlled roughly 49% percent of the Japanese
economy in the areas of “mining, machinery, shipbuilding, and chemicals,” as well as
50 percent of banking, 60 percent of insurance, and 61 percent of shipbuilding by the
41

end of the war. They were diverse enterprises and had their hands in everything from
mining to aircraft to consumer goods. The debate over whether or not to dismantle the
zaibatsu
arose from the debate over whether they unfairly restricted economic activity
and the free market in Japan. MacArthur and his staff believed that a democratic Japan
would be a Japan free from the influence of powerful business leaders in accordance
with President Truman’s wishes.
Under President Truman’s directive, MacArthur would carry out a plan to dissolve
the 
zaibatsu
and to liberalize Japan’s economy. But while MacArthur’s original steps to
democratize Japanese industry were seen as a success in U.S. media, just two years
later, SCAP’s economic reforms in Japan were denounced, as too socialist, and
economic restructuring became a main target of the policy reversal. I will argue in this
chapter that the 
zaibatsu
reforms were unsuccessful because the Japanese economy
John W. Dower,
Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II,1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton
& Co./New Press, 1999), 530.
41
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continued to struggle and because popular support in Japan, and more importantly in
the United States, turned against the reforms due in large part to Cold War fears. I will
show that both the structure and purpose of the 
zaibatsu
reforms were undermined as a
result of new U.S. administered economic policy that supported big business and
economic stabilization over democratization.
T.A. Bisson, a key SCAP reformer argues in his memoir, 
Zaibatsu Dissolution in
Japan
(1954), that while headquarters officials in Tokyo had not originated the
42

dissolution plan they were responsible for implementing it. The plan, he says, came
43

from Truman’s directive under which SCAP operated until the middle of 1947. He also
44

claims that they did not move “beyond the authority vested in them.” However, he says
that by the end of 1947, after proceeding cautiously for two years, GHQ was moving at
45

full steam. And while he believes that GHQ had every right to commit to the measures
it implemented, early favor for MacArthur’s dissolution program steadily diminished as
the Cold War intensified; by 1948, under pressure by the Army, Congress, and U.S.
business circles, GHQ drew back from its reform program.

46

In his book 
Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in Japan
,
Hidemasa Morikawa, a Tokyo University Professor of business, argues that during the
Allied Occupation following Japan’s defeat, the Holding Company Liquidation
Commission (HCLC) under SCAP dissolved the last remnants of already weakened

T. A. Bisson, 
Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 2.
Bisson, 
Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan
, 2.
44
Bisson, 
Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan
, 2.
45
Bisson, 
Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan
, 2.
46
Bisson, 
Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan
, 2.
42
43
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47

groups. Morikawa points to wartime pressures under military rule as corrosive and
ruinous for the 
zaibatsu
. He traces 
zaibatsu
demise starting during the 1930s
Depression, then he focuses on the outbreak of war with China in 1937, which led to
48

unprecedented levels of military demand and influence over 
zaibatsu
affairs. Key to
Morikawa’s argument is his assertion that the new 
zaibatsu
such as Nissan, which were
not really 
zaibatsu
in the traditional sense, and benefited from the war because of their
49

disproportionate focus on heavy industry. But the old 
zaibatsu
, including Mitsui, that
relied primarily on industries such as banking and commerce did not profit as much from
50

wartime industry. Although all the 
zaibatsu
ultimately cooperated with the military,
Morikawa believes that the real preference of the old 
zaibatsu
was to avoid war
because doing so protected their interests and assets and because war meant higher
51

taxes and decreased freedom. In short, he claims they had not participated in the war
52

out of choice, but rather out of necessity.

He further argues that despite claims by many critics to the contrary, the reversal
of Occupation policy did not lead to a resurgence of the 
zaibatsu
, but instead to their
53

destruction. Family fortunes, he says, were destroyed by confiscation and taxes,
founding families could no longer be major shareholders, and control of the corporations

Hidemasa Morikawa, 

Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in Japan
(Tokyo, Japan:
University of Tokyo Press, 1992), 223.
48
Morikawa, 

Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall,
223.
49
Morikawa, 
Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall,
226227.
50
Morikawa, 
Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall,
226227.
51
Morikawa, 

Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall
, 227228.
52
Morikawa, 

Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall,
228.
53
Morikawa, 
Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall,
239.
47
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54

was handed to salaried managers. With exclusive family membership gone and their
55

control eliminated, “the 
zaibatsu
were indeed dissolved.”

Were the 
zaibatsu
necessarily dangerous to a fledgling democracy? And were
they really destroyed? 
Zaibatsu
new, and old, may have suffered greatly during the first
three years of the Occupation, but they ultimately escaped total dissolution as the
reforms targeting them were reversed beginning in 1948. Further, the conglomerates
helped supply American forces during the Korean War and played a crucial role in
Japan’s economic revival beginning in the 1950s. Today, the same 
zaibatsu
names that
were the subject of dissolution, such as Mitsui and Nissan, dominate the Japanese and
the global markets. To understand how these companies went from dissolution back to
dominance, we need to examine the period directly after the war, from 1945 until Japan
regained independence in 1952.
This chapter begins by examining several primary sources, including President
Truman’s Directive to SCAP that was issued at the outset of the Occupation. I will then
explore how this directive was shaped into new policies by SCAP by studying original
text from the Yasuda Plan/SCAPIN 244, the first proposed plan for dissolving the
zaibatsu
. Next, I will inspect FEC230, a more comprehensive plan for dissolution, and
determine how its wording differed from that in the Yasuda Plan. I will also analyze
segments from a Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing that took place on
December 19, 1947. The series of hearings, led by Senator William F. Knowland, a
Republican from California, helped increase support in the U.S. government for
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dramatic changes in U.S. economic policy in Japan. I will then examine the document
that signaled the reversal of anti
zaibatsu
policy titled “Change in Deconcentration
Policy, April 19, 1948.” In addition to these key government documents I will look at
newspaper articles published in the United States responding to MacArthur’s efforts to
dissolve the 
zaibatsu
.
As suggested by T.A. Bisson, it was not MacArthur who had originally called for
the death of the 
zaibatsu
, rather it was President Harry S. Truman. It was the belief of
President Truman that initiative had to be taken immediately to ensure a successful
occupation of Japan. From the start of the Occupation, MacArthur was tasked with
specific directives from the President. Issued on September 6, 1945, President
Truman’s directive (also known as the ‘US Initial PostSurrender Policy for Japan’)
ordered the liberalization of the Japanese economy. The directive gave SCAP the task
of undertaking “forms of economic activity, organization and leadership” that would
56

“strengthen the peaceful disposition” of the Japanese. A major goal in promoting free
trade was to make it difficult to “command or direct economic activity in support of
military ends.”

57

The directive called for encouragement of the development of labor

unions, industry, and agriculture, all of which should be “organized on a democratic
58

basis.” Policies would be favored which permitted “a wide distribution of income and of
59

the ownership of the means of production and trade.” According to President Truman,
SCAP’s economic policy focus in Japan would be:
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a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the
economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic
effort solely towards peaceful ends; and
b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and
banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of
60
Japan’s trade and industry.
Attempting to meet the President’s expectations and his own objectives, MacArthur and
his staff immediately set about to devise a program to dissolve the 
zaibatsu
.
A key figure in MacArthur’s economic plans, Colonel Raymond C. Kramer, the
first Chief of the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) of General Headquarters,
61

arranged to meet with 
zaibatsu
leaders in October of 1945. Kramer ordered the
zaibatsu
to dismantle themselves voluntarily. Fearing the alternative, Yasuda (one of
the ‘Big Four’) immediately started working with SCAP in order to help create a proposal
62

for dissolution. This makes sense because in theory, no one would know the inner
workings and bureaucracy of the 
zaibatsu
better than the 
zaibatsu
leaders themselves.
At the same time, it would be beneficial for companies to have a say in how harsh the
dissolution plan would be and to structure the plan as they pleased. The ‘Big Four’
combines, including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, were the original targets
63

of the dissolution plan.

By November 6, 1945, Occupation authorities had created a preliminary
64

dissolution plan for Japan’s 
zaibatsu
. In the span of about a month, working with
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zaibatsu
executives and Japanese government officials, Occupation authorities gained
approval from Washington, and “formally endorsed” through an official SCAP directive
65

to the Japanese government, what became known as the Yasuda Plan. In contrast to
the top down approach later used by SCAP, the Yasuda plan presented the 
zaibatsu
with a great deal of autonomy to carry out reforms on their own.
In August of 1946, the Japanese government passed the Yasuda Plan (SCAPIN
66

244), and the Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC) was set up. It
immediately set out to dispose of the shares of 83 holding companies. Sixteen were
67

dissolved, including 10 of the major 
zaibatsu
. Ultimately, 26 conglomerates were
dismantled and then restructured, eleven reorganized, and 30 left intact.

68

While the President’s directive had called for the dissolution of large industrial
and banking combinations, what is notable about Truman’s directive is the lack of
specifics; in other words, MacArthur and his staff were allowed to interpret the plan as
they saw fit. The vagueness of the language in the original directive is important
because it would first carry over into the Yasuda Plan. The following are key excerpts
from the Yasuda Plan as proposed to SCAP on November 4, 1945:
A. OFFICIAL JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR HOLDING COMPANY
DISSOLUTION INCORPORATING THE YASUDA PLAN,
November 4, 1945.
The firms of Mitsui Honsha, Yasuda Hozensha, Sumitomo Honsha,
and Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Honsha, hereinafter referred to as
the “Holding Companies,” have been holding conversations with the
Minister of Finance with a view to voluntary dissolution in
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accordance with the desires of the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers.
The following plan is proposed for your approval to govern the
dissolution of these firms and such other firms of similar character
as may volunteer for dissolution:
1. a. The Holding Companies will transfer to a Holding Company
Liquidation Commission all securities owned by them and all other
evidences of ownership or control of any interest in any firm,
corporation or other enterprise.
b. The Holding Companies will cease to exercise direction or control,
either directly or indirectly, of all financial, industrial, commercial or
noncommercial enterprises whose securities they own or of which
they hold any other evidences of ownership or control.
c. The directors and auditors of the Holding Companies will resign all
offices held by them in such Holding Companies immediately after
the transfer of the securities and other evidences of ownership
referred to in paragraph 1a of this Memorandum and cease
forthwith to exercise any influence, either directly or indirectly, in the
management or policies of the Holding Companies affected by this
dissolution.
d. All members of the Mitsui, Yasuda, Sumitomo, and Iwasaki families
will immediately resign all offices held by them in any financial,
commercial, noncommercial, or industrial enterprises and cease
forthwith to exercise any influence, either directly or indirectly, in the
management or policies of the enterprises affected by this
69
dissolution.
When comparing this excerpt from the Yasuda Plan against the directive, we can
see that it meets several of the initial requirements called for by President Truman.
Truman’s directive had called for “the dissolution of the large industrial and banking

69
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70

combinations.” The directive stated that SCAP must: “prohibit the retention in or
selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct
71

future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends.” In other words,
Truman’s directive called for an end to founding family ownership of large
conglomerates. Point “c” of the Yasuda plan called on the directors and auditors of the
holding companies to vacate office, and point “d” of the Yasuda Plan called for all
zaibatsu
family members to resign from all offices in all industry involved directly or
72

indirectly with the 
zaibatsu
.
Although the Yasuda plan seemed to address many of the underlying power
dynamics of the Japanese combines, and despite the fact that its reach was
unprecedented, it was in many ways not severe enough in the eyes of MacArthur’s
GHQ reformers and some bureaucrats back in Washington. Historian Takemae Eiji
suggests that the Yasuda Plan was “patently selfserving and full of loopholes.”

73

Takemae points out that although the Yasuda Plan proposed to disband the holding
companies and force families to resign from their positions, it left lowerlevel affiliates in
the subsidiaries in their positions and therefore maintained the essential ties and
74

infrastructure of the organization. Writing in 2001, Eleanor Hadley, a key player on
MacArthur’s economic staff, reflected that after the adoption of the Yasuda Plan, SCAP
appeared to be dealing with holding companies but not the entire combines, as she
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75

believed the directive had called for. Similar to Takemae, Hadley noted that the
holding companies formed only the “corporate peak” of a combine’s organization and
that there were many ties still binding the combines together; eliminating just holding
companies would leave many of those ties intact, including “intracombine ownership,
76

interlocking directors, joint credit, joint buying and selling.” In a 
Newsweek
article
published in February of 1947, MacArthur declared that he had aggressively pursued
77

the economic purge in compliance with the basic directive by which he was bound. He
may, as is discussed later, have been responding to criticisms from proJapanese
business elements in the United States who were damaging his image right before his
1948 presidential bid. But, despite MacArthur’s initial confidence in the Yasuda Plan, he
soon came to adopt a much harsher dissolution plan.
In January of 1946, a joint departmental mission was sent to Japan, by the State
and Justice Departments, led by Northeastern University economist Corwin D. Edwards.
78

The mission came in response to what the State and Justice Departments saw as
79

MacArthur’s seemingly “lackadaisical” attitude towards the 
zaibatsu
. Edward’s report
titled “The Report of the Mission on Japanese Combines,” was critical of the Yasuda
Plan because it left “major operating subsidiaries” untouched and ignored practices
80

such as “interlocking directorates” and “crossholding of corporate stocks.” Edwards
proposed tough antitrust legislation that would dissolve the 
zaibatsu
and prevent new
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81

conglomerates from rising. Significantly, the Edward’s report went far beyond the
recommendations of the Yasuda Plan. He urged the breakup of all “economic
enterprises” constituting “an excessive concentration of economic power” and a
82

“potential threat to competitive enterprise.” All 
zaibatsu
assets including real estate
would be broken up and sold to executives, employees, labor unions, cooperatives, and
83

the general public. In response to the Mission’s belief that the Yasuda plan had been
ineffective in reforming Japan’s corporate structures, Edwards recommended targeting
the interweaving of personnel and capital assets between 
zaibatsu
banks and individual
subsidiaries.

84

Edward’s report was incorporated into a policy proposal called FEC230. The
proposal took its name from The Far Eastern Commission. The Commission was an
advisory committee set up by the Allied powers after winning the war. The FEC was
supposed to oversee occupation policy in Japan and advise SCAP, although it had no
power to enforce its decisions. FEC230 was incorporated into law by the Japanese
government in July of 1947 with the name “The ‘Bill for the Elimination of
Concentrations of Economic Power’”; it targeted any firm seen as restricting market
85

access.

In 
Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy
, Takemae Eiji
suggests that the officials in GHQ most closely involved in 
zaibatsu
dissolution were
either New Dealers themselves or had helped plan the Japanese deconcentration

Takemae, Inside
GHQ
, 335.
Takemae, Inside
GHQ
, 336.
83
Takemae, Inside
GHQ
,
336.

84
Takemae, Inside
GHQ
, 336.
85
Takemae, Inside
GHQ
, 337.
81
82

23

86

program in Washington during the war. Among them was Charles Kades, an idealistic,
87

influential lawyer in GHQ’s Government Section. Kades was an exemplary New
88

Dealer who played a pivotal role in drafting Japan’s new constitution. As Deputy Chief
of the Government Section, Kades chaired GHQ's Steering Committee on revising
89

Japan's constitution. The authors suggest that it might have been Kades, who
MacArthur trusted immensely, and the other trustbusters in his organization, who
90

convinced MacArthur of what Takemae deems the merit of “radical dissolution.”
Other scholars such as Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer agree with

Takemae’s assessment of GHQ as a hotbed for New Deal liberals. In 
The Fable of the
Keiretsu
, Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer argue that academics, including
Edwards, working for SCAP and the State Department who had liberal ideological
agendas were responsible for most of the policies against the 
zaibatsu
. Yoshiro and
Ramseyer argue that in creating his report, “Edwards understood his job: it was not to
91

decide what to do about the 
zaibatsu
but to justify destroying them.” More than that,
they allege that “the report was remarkably devoid of economic logic” and despite its
purpose to gather information, the mission led to a report “equally devoid of new
information.”
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Regardless of the intentions of the Edward’s report and FEC230, it was clear
that by 1947, economic conditions in Japan were not improving. A 
Washington Post
article from November 18, 1946 reveals just how desperate the Japanese were for even
basic necessities while economic reforms were taking place, and how the U.S. public
was aware of their situation. The “Japanese ran so critically short of food in September
93

that in some localities 75 per cent of their rations were furnished by imports.” Despite
such figures, MacArthur’s monthly report, contained in the news article, stressed that
“greater yields of rice, wheat, potatoes and barley” could be expected in the next year
94

along with an increased fish catch. In addition, MacArthur stressed, “Arrangements
were under way to expand [overall] exports to Russia, England and Eustralia [Australia],
95

while exports to the United States increased.” However, despite MacArthur’s optimistic
reports, unrest continued in Japan and both inflation and starvation ran rampant.
Labor unions were established quickly after the Occupation began and within the
96

first year of the Occupation, more than 4.5 million Japanese joined a union. Inflation
and unemployment continued to increase after the war and the unions soon took radical
action. In late 1945, for example, railway workers seized control of the Tokyo train and
trolley system and allowed everyone to ride for free; then on May Day of 1946, in the
biggest demonstration in Japan’s history, over 2 million men, women, and children, took
to the streets to demand wage increases, political power, and worker control of the
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97

factories. By the fall of 1946, over one hundred strikes had hit Japanese industries,
98

from car factories to movie studios.

Beginning in 1947, events on the international stage began to bring about
changes in occupation policies. In 1947, communist forces led by Mao Zedong were
routing the armies of American ally Chiang KaiShek in China while in Eastern Europe
many communist regimes were emerging, and many in the American government
99

feared an international communist plot led by Joseph Stalin. In Japan, this seemed to
parallel the rise of communists and seemingly contiguous labor unions.
The labor movement peaked in the winter of 1947 as labor leaders called for a
general strike to shut down the entire country. However, as the labor movement grew in
strength, rifts began to form at Occupation Headquarters between those, such as
General Charles Andrew Willoughby, MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence, who believed
communists were gaining control of the labor unions and those who wished to continue
supporting labor reforms.

100 

General MacArthur called a ban on the general strike,
101 

permanently crippling the Communist Party.

The ban signaled a reversal in the

Occupation’s previous policies towards unions.
In his book 
Aftermath of War
, Howard B.
Schonberger points to what he sees as

an often ignored group that had great responsibility for changing American economic
97
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policy in Japan in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Japan Lobby. Within the Japan
Lobby were the American Council on Japan, 
Newsweek
magazine, politicians, some
102

State Department officials, and major U.S. corporations with investments in Japan.

One of the more important leaders, according to Schonberger, was Harry F. Kern, an
editor at 
Newsweek
with powerful connections to the wealthy and powerful in the USA
103 

and in Japan.

After reports on MacArthur’s new policy developments in Japan

garnered from friends, starting in 1946, Kern became angered and then went on a trip to
Japan in June of 1947 to observe MacArthur’s policies in action.

104 

Starting in early

1947 and growing increasingly scathing after his trip in 1947, Kern and 
Newsweek
released a number of articles attacking MacArthur’s policies as damaging Japan’s ability
to resist communism internally and externally.

105 

To Kern, “immature, untrained, and

impractical officers” in GHQ were responsible for a program that “undermined American
capitalist principles in Japan.”

106 

Kern immediately set about organizing the Lobby,

which included former U.S. President Herbert Hoover, Retired Vice Admiral William
Veazie Pratt, prominent lawyer James Lee Kauffman, Undersecretary of the Army
William Draper, and Secretary of Defense James F. Forrestal, to name some of those
107 

involved.

MacArthur’s actions from this point on began to catch the attention of

leaders in Washington.
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SCAP had through its reforms busted up big business in an attempt to make a
nation of small capitalists and by doing so upset conservatives in the United States. In
the fall elections of 1946, Republicans won control of Congress in the United States;
there was concern among many of them that land reform, the breaking up of the
zaibatsu
, and the purge of business leaders, could potentially have a negative effect in
Japan and could move it towards socialism.

108 

According to, then Diet member,

Yasuhiro Nakasone, who later served as Prime Minister, many members of the
Japanese government feared that the Occupation reformers were trying to turn Japan
into a socialist country, and so conservatives in the Japanese government and
conservatives in U.S. government joined forces to undermine some of the earlier
reforms.

109 

The growing distrust of MacArthur and his Occupation staff soon began to

surface in the U.S. press.

110

Later newspaper articles are more explicit in their criticism of SCAP’s economic
policy in Japan. For example, a 
Washington Post 
article published on March 10, 1947,
titled “Jap Economic Crisis Is Occupation Peril,” warns of the deteriorating economic
conditions in Japan and the implications for GHQ policies. The economic situation in
Japan was said to have gotten steadily worse consistently since the beginning of the
Occupation. If changes were not made, the article asserted, Japan would face “a long
111 

period of economic unrest, perhaps starvation and political unrest.”

Greater amounts
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of food imports would be required for 1947 than for 1946 to enable even “a minimum
standard of living.”

112 

In 1946, “700,000 tons of food were imported,” while in 1947,

1,600,000 tons would be needed.

113 

Such a situation would not be conducive to the
114 

development of democracy or stability.

Significantly, the article suggests that the

decisions SCAP had made, including the dissolution of the 
zaibatsu
had contributed to
this worsening economic state. The removal of “all industrialists” and businessmen who
contributed to the wartime economy had “robbed Japan’s business life” of much of its
115 

“competence.”

Allegedly, the purge had been so extensive that it seemed to prevent

anyone eligible to run a business from doing so, and this had resulted in new,
incompetent leadership.

116 

The article states that in reevaluating the prospects for the

restoration of economic stability, MacArthur would have to reconsider his purge of the
industrial leadership. The article might also reveal how popular sentiment was shifting
against MacArthur’s policies as they increasingly appeared ineffective in dealing with
Japan’s worsening economic woes.
By December of 1947, FEC230 reached the halls of Congress, where it was
investigated in Congressional hearings. Senator William F. Knowland, a Republican
from California, who would later become House Majority Leader, challenged President
Truman on the ethicality of FEC230, as well as its effect on a still desperate Japan.
Senator Knowland criticized the bill for being issued under “confidential classification on
the 12th of May [1947]” and took issue with the fact that “very few members of the
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117 

Senate or the House of Representatives” had seen the document.

Knowland then

quoted a correspondent from a major American newspaper [unspecified] who had
recently remarked that the bills passed with FEC230 as a guide were “the most
socialistic ever attempted outside of Russia.”

118 

Among the issues being debated by the

Senate Appropriations Committee were:
1) Whether FEC230 is a fair interpretation of President Truman’s directive
to make Japan safe and selfsufficient or whether it is a wasteful scheme
which will perpetuate the cost of the United States occupation;
2) Whether FEC230 will “democratize” and pacify Japan or whether it will
socialize that country and keep it in chaos and poverty;
3) Whether the State and Defense Departments were justified in keeping
the document secret so that they could negotiate effectively in the Far
Eastern Commission, or whether this was merely a device for keeping a
119
controversial policy quiet while it was being implemented in Japan.
Further evidence of changing attitudes on Japanese economic reform are
revealed in an article in the 
Los Angeles Times
from December 25, 1947, titled
"Knowland Plan Makes Headway," which reveals that during that time period, Senator
Knowland’s efforts to roll back Japanese economic reform were working. The article
also reports that Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett, in defense of MacArthur,
stated that efforts to break up the 
zaibatsu
and to achieve positive reform had been
120 

accomplished.

Knowland’s investigation argued otherwise. Knowland’s criticism,

voiced in a speech to the Senate a week before this article was published suggested
that MacArthur’ had carried out an “arbitrary purge” under which all former managers,
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stockholders and creditors of large businesses were being divested of their holdings
121 

and positions and barred from holding them for 10 years, without any trial.”

The

measures in FEC230 were said to be “contrary to American standards of decency and
fair play” and went far beyond what would be an acceptable amount of government
122

control by most American’s standards.

A
New York Times
articles from March 16, 1948 titled: “Easing of Policies
Expected in Japan” reveals that MacArthur’s plans to remove the 
zaibatsu
were no
longer being followed.

123 

The article reports that the State and Army Departments “have

decided to restudy the policy indicated as FEC 230.”

124 

The article suggests that GHQ

officials had proceeded to implement FEC230 “despite objections from American
125

business and political circles” who saw it as “socialization of the Japanese economy.”
The GHQ plan [FEC230] had called for large companies to be split up not because
126 

they dominated their fields, but “simply because they were big.”

Under General

MacArthur’s authority, the government section of GHQ had obliged the Japanese Diet to
pass another bill forbidding “
zaibatsu
appointees,” business executives who had been
appointed to their jobs by the ten leading family holding companies, from working for
any company previously associated with the same 
zaibatsu
group for a period of ten
years.

127 

The reporter argues further that because of growing opposition to MacArthur's

policies at home, “The feeling here is that these laws, or at least the economic
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deconcentration law, will probably stay on the books, but that standards will be eased
so that the impact upon business will be less disastrous.

128

On March 12, 1948, the U.S. withdrew its support of FEC 230 and within the
same month published the DraperJohnston Mission Report.

129 

The DraperJohnston

Mission was implemented in order to reorient GHQ, and public thinking, towards new
U.S. economic policy in Japan.

130 

The visit to Japan by Undersecretary of the

Department of the Army, William Draper [a part of the Japan Lobby], and a group of big
business representatives, aimed at addressing the problem of economic recovery in
Japan in 1948.

131 

A Headquarters memorandum released in midApril of 1948 outlined

the new U.S. economic policy in Japan:
(1) No banks were to be considered as excessive concentrations or
reorganized under the Deconcentration Law;
(2) No more than twenty companies were to be subject to reorganization
under the Law and these were to be chosen on the basis that they
were interfering with Japanese economic recovery;
(3) All the rest were to be removed from designation with no less than 100
companies taken off in the first such action and where necessary to be
132
remanded to the Fair Trade Commission for surveillance.
Basically, most of the major 
zaibatsu 
dissolution measures would be reversed. This was
achieved by way of Senator Knowland’s Senate Hearings, news articles critical of the
occupation, such as those in 
Newsweek
, and by the lobbying of U.S. business interests
who were frightened of the worsening business climate in Japan. In addition to
reversing the dissolution of the 
zaibatsu
, in December of 1948, Washington announced
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133 

“nine principles of economic stabilization” to be imposed in Japan.

Headed by Joseph

Dodge, a Detroit banker, a mission was sent to Japan to carry out a change in
134 

economic policy.

By 1950, Dodge had reined in Japan’s rampant inflation; on June

25, the Korean War broke out, stimulating the Japanese economy immensely through
135 

military procurement.
economic revival.

Dodge’s actions as well as this new boom had brought about an

136

The successors of the 
zaibatsu
, known as the 
keiretsu
, have some differences
which are important to note. The Occupation succeeded in breaking up the 
zaibatsu
into
separate groups based on their original subsidiaries, or smaller groups, between 1945
and 1948. Today’s 
keiretsu
are generally publically traded and are not run solely by
family members but by powerful boards. However, when the Occupation’s 
zaibatsu
reforms ended in 1948, many of the subsidiaries once again merged and grew into
conglomerates. The story of Mitsubishi exemplifies the story of reconsolidation.
In 1950, Kowa Jitsugyo, one of the former subsidiaries, was allowed to take over
137

the old assets and businesses of Mitsubishi Shoji (the old Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu
). GHQ
also loosened restrictions on employing the old officers and employees; and as a result,
the new Mitsubishi conglomerate began to emerge.

138 

In 1952, Kowa Jitsugyo adopted

the name Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha (MSK); soon after, it began negotiations with three of
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Mitsubishi’s old subsidiaries that had emerged as the core companies, including Fuji
139 

Shoji, Tokyo Boeki and Tozai Koeki.

Under “encouragement” from the elders of the

old Mitsubishi organization, the four companies eventually reached an agreement and
140 

merged into the new Mitsubishi Shoji conglomerate.

Katsujiro Takagaki, the former

president of Fuji Shoji, became the new company’s first president and sought to bring
the company under a common philosophy, originally articulated by Koyata Iwasaki, the
fourth president of the original Mitsubishi organization. Takagaki remarked that: “A
company is a profitmaking organization, but the unbridled pursuit of profit by any
means possible is not a philosophy that we subscribe to. We must strive to establish a
sound and ethical corporate culture by acting fairly at all times and taking pride in our
141 

role as of one of Japan's leading trading companies."

From the end of 1954, the U.S.

economy began to recover and sparked an upturn in the global economy; the new
Mitsubishi Shoji went on to expand its business as Japan entered a period of
unprecedented economic growth.

142

In 1960, the party in power of the Japanese government was the conservative
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); it was run by Nobusuke Kishi, a man who had been
143 

jailed as a war criminal during the American Occupation.

Kishi owed his comeback to

his prewar contacts with big business and his skill at backroom deals.

144 

Those close
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ties between big business and politicians in Japan were the primary reasons for the
Occupation’s 
zaibatsu
reforms. However, these close and potentially corrupting ties still
exist today. In his article 
Toshiba Scandal Exposes Japan’s Weak Oversight
, reporter
William Pesek argues that a recent scandal in 2015 involving Toshiba Corporation, in
which it overstated profits by roughly $1.2 billion, outlines the lack of corporate
145 

accountability in Japan.

The scandal, he says, undermines Shinzo Abe’s [Prime

Minister, and current head of the LDP] claims that his government is pursuing a
revolution in corporate governance including increased transparency and accountability.
146

A large part of the problem, Pesek argues, is the practice of “
amakudari
” in which

bureaucrats, after they leave government, receive lucrative jobs in the industries they
oversee; because of this they tend to go easy on offending CEOs when scandals arise.
147

Beginning in 1948, both the structure and purpose of the 
zaibatsu
reforms were
undermined as the U.S. withdrew support for the Occupation’s economic reforms.
Japan’s economy had remained in tatters after the war. Inflation and unemployment
were widespread and imports continued to provide nearly all of Japan’s food supply.
While communists had been released from prison, and labor unions encouraged to
form, in order to counter 
zaibatsu
influence, both soon came under scrutiny by
conservatives in the Japanese and U.S. governments. International events, including

William Pesek, "Toshiba Scandal Exposes Japan's Weak Oversight," 
The Japan Times
, July 22, 2015.
Accessed March 16, 2016.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/07/22/commentary/japancommentary/toshibascandalexposesja
pansweakoversight/#.Vuj8ROIrLRY
.
146
William Pesek, "Toshiba Scandal Exposes Japan's Weak Oversight," 
The Japan Times
, July 22, 2015.
147
William Pesek, "Toshiba Scandal Exposes Japan's Weak Oversight," 
The Japan Times
, July 22, 2015.
145

35

the routing of ChiangKai Shek, and transition of numerous countries in Eastern Europe
to communist regimes, led to a new international climate and growing fear of
communism in the United States. As labor union demonstrations grew to massive
proportions in 1947, U.S. politicians decided to take action. And in 1948, the United
States Government withdrew its support for anti
zaibatsu
policies, and instead began to
encourage Japan’s Government to once again support big business, the 
zaibatsu
.
Beginning in June of 1950, with the onset of the Korean War, Japan’s industrial
powerhouses, the 
zaibatsu
, started down a path to growth and prosperity at a speed
unrivaled in history. As the story of Mitsubishi shows, the successors of Japan’s
zaibatsu
, the 
keiretsu
,
have successfully returned to prominence and surpassed their

prewar size and strength under the guidance of their old leadership and old employees,
as well as new equally adept leadership, thanks to the reversal of the Occupation’s
reforms. And as the recent scandal at Toshiba has once again brought to light, the close
and compromising relationships between government and big business in Japan that
Occupation reforms had attempted to severe, exist to this day. While Japan’s economy
stabilized and has prospered, the Occupation’s reform of the 
zaibatsu
failed.
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Chapter II: Education Reform
“The prewar education system suppressed freedom of thought and conscience,
ignored basic human rights, and intently pressured the entire country toward war” said
Mogi Yohio, a former middle school principal in Japan during the war writing in 1986 to
148

the 
Asahi Shimbun
. As defense spending surpassed one percent of the GNP and a
national secrets bill was proposed, “we are in danger of repeating the errors of the past”
he wrote.

149 

There is little debate amongst scholars that education played a crucial role

in supporting the indoctrination of young Japanese into the principles of Japanese
nationalism and that such education helped fuel militarism up to and during World War
II, however, a fierce debate rages today in Japan, and abroad, about the current
direction of education in Japan and whether it may contribute to a return to militaristic
nationalism. In this chapter I will examine postWorld War II reforms to the education
system that were imposed by the Occupation. The reforms were intended to demilitarize
and democratize Japan’s education system and to spread democratic ideals. I argue
that the education reforms were successful as a result of widespread popular support
and that they have outlasted pressures to recentralize in part due to the introduction of
teachers’ unions.
Because education served as a means of shaping Japanese political and cultural
values from a young age, it was an essential target for reform in the creation of a new
democracy. Not only was subject matter democratized, but the administration of schools
was also democratized and decentralized to prevent control by national political parties,
148
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the Ministry of Education, or special interest groups. In this chapter I will examine
whether those efforts were successful by seeing if the structure and purpose of the
education reforms remained in place through the end of the Cold War. I will show that
the democratization of the Japanese education system was successful despite threats
induced by anticommunist fears. And I will show how the reforms weathered efforts by
powerful conservative segments of the Japanese government to recentralize the
system after independence in 1952.
The first policy directive issued by the U.S. government that addressed expected
changes to Japan’s education system was called the “Basic Initial Post Surrender
Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control
of Japan (JCS1380/15);” it was sent to General Douglas MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs
150 

of Staff on November 3, 1945.

Besides outlining economic, military, and political goals

for the Occupation, the directive outlined goals for reform of the education system in
Japan. The new education system would be required to aid in the “strengthening of
democratic tendencies and processes in governmental, economic and social
institutions; and the encouragement and support of liberal political tendencies in Japan.”
151

In addition, all teachers who had been “active exponents of militant nationalism” and

those who opposed the military occupation would be fired and replaced.

152 

Just as the

Japanese education system had been used to indoctrinate Japanese youth into the
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mindset of militant nationalism, the American Occupation would alter that same system
to indoctrinate the Japanese youth with concepts of democracy.
In his book 
American Interlude
, published in 1960, historian Kazuo Kawai argues
that the prewar system of education in Japan was a “notorious instrument” for instilling
“a reactionary and ultra nationalistic point of view” and that in order for democracy to
make headway, revolutionary reform was needed.

153 

He also argues, however, that the

Japanese people’s permanent acceptance of the reforms ensured the reforms’ success.
154

I agree with Kazuo and will show how reforms to the Japanese education system

were popular and widely accepted and how that aided in ensuring that they remained in
place.
In his article, “Making Peace with Hirohito and a Militaristic Past,” published in
1989, 
Asahi Shimbun
editorial writer Kurita Wataru argues that prewar education
focused too much on the imperial institution, but that those educated in postwar Japan
have learned too little about the emperor and about militarism as a result of the new
postwar education system.

155 

In order to take an “equal and honored place” in “the

community of nations,” he asserts, Japan must face its militarist past beginning with the
156 

education system and must rethink its acceptance of the emperor system.

I will show

that the Ministry of Education, by continuing to censor Japanese textbooks to remove
militaristic history, a move originally sanctioned by the Occupation, has created a
dangerous pattern of ambivalence among many Japanese. However, I will also show
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that unions have allowed teachers to retain a great deal of autonomy in creating their
own curriculums, and this I argue is an important legacy of the Occupation education
reforms.
In his book 
Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan,
19451952
, historian Toshio Nishi argues that after the Americans left Japan and the
Occupation ended, “indigenous Japanese forms remained” and remained
“conspicuously, at that.”

157 

Important and lasting changes were made under the

occupation, for instance, the number of years of compulsory education were expanded
158 

under new educational requirements.

However, education in the ideals of

“democracy, popular sovereignty, individual human rights, and freedom of the press”
are not concepts that have been fully embraced in Japan and Japanese still have great
respect for authority as long as initiatives are seemingly taken for the national interest.
159

I will show that while Occupation expectations for curriculums focused on democracy

initially left many Japanese befuddled, the teachings caught on quickly and were
embraced by the Japanese people. In addition, pacifism continues to be an important
concept taught in schools as a result of ideological changes introduced during the
Occupation.
What did the Japanese education system look like before the Occupation and
what elements could endanger a fledgling democracy? Writing in 1964, General
MacArthur recalled that when he arrived in Japan, he was deeply concerned with the
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education system. According to MacArthur, in the war years, the Japanese state
exercised central control over the schools; the Ministry of Education in Tokyo chose the
textbooks, for all subjects, which were filled with militaristic, antiAmerican teachings,
and there were no local school boards or superintendents.

160 

Until the Occupation,

General MacArthur notes, “the schools, newspapers, theater, radio, and motion
pictures” were all part of the state propaganda machine.

161 

They existed for the purpose

of “thought control” rather than for their own “intrinsic purpose.”

162 

In examining the

basis of Japanese education, I will first focus on the Meiji Constitution and 1890 Imperial
Rescript on Education.
Toshio Nishi argues that the 1889 Meiji Constitution and the 1890 Imperial
163

Rescript on Education were the two most important documents of Imperial Japan.

The Meiji Constitution, he says, “codified the sanctity and inviolability of the Emperor”
while the Rescript on Education turned the Japanese education system into a tool by
which “the people’s loyalty to the throne was nurtured.”

164 

The 1890 Imperial Rescript on
165 

Education was promulgated by the Imperial Government on October 30, 1890.

The

Rescript says that Japan was founded by the Imperial Ancestors on “a basis broad and
everlasting” and with “deeply and firmly implanted virtue” including “loyalty and filial
166 

piety;” these values served as the basis of Japanese education in ethics.

In addition,
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the Rescript calls for subjects to offer themselves “courageously to the State” in the
event an “emergency” arose, thereby guarding and maintaining the “Imperial Throne.”

167

From 18901945, The Imperial Rescript served as the basis for moral education in
schools and led to a strong emphasis on nationalism, Emperor worship, and working for
state, as the new focus of schooling.
Democratic teachings had become a target of the Ministry of Education in the
late 1800s. In 1880, the government compiled a list of books favorable to democracy
and banned their use in schools as textbooks.

168 

Then, in 1886 a textbook certification

program was created by the Ministry of Education, and after 1904 elementary school
169 

textbooks were produced by the government.

Shortly after 1900, Japan achieved an

enrollment rate of more than 90 percent and successfully increased the length
compulsory education from three to six years.

170 

While nearly every child now received

a basic education, historian Ienaga Saburo, who attended school during Japan’s war
years, argues that the content of this education caused a uniform outlook for most
Japanese through the teaching of “stateapproved knowledge.”

171

The textbooks, which had been either censored or compiled by the Ministry of
Education, contained “moral” lessons in every subject. An elementary school ethics
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book for second graders published in 1903 stressed loyalty to the emperor first and
foremost.

172 

Here is one example provided by Ienaga:

Lesson 23.
The Emperor attends the annual maneuvers of the army and
navy and watches the soldiers and sailors perform their duties. We must
173
appreciate the emperor’s royal benevolence.
In addition, even from a young age, students were taught that war was noble. Here is
another example provided by Ienaga:
Lesson 24. 
Kiguchi Kohei was not the least bit afraid before the enemy.
He bravely sounded the call to advance on his bugle three times. Inspired
by his brave example, our troops attacked and defeated the enemy, but
Kiguchi was hit by a bullet and fell to the ground mortally wounded. Later
174
they found his body with the bugle still at his lips.
Ienaga argues that it became the objective of the Government to “militarize the
entire curriculum” during and after the RussoJapanese War (February 8,
1904September 5, 1905).
176

175 

The war and nationalism were to be taught in every class.

Arithmetic, for example, focused on examples about military matters, science

focused on information about “searchlights, wireless communication, lands mines” and
so forth.

177 

And physical education included “character training and war games.”

178 

He

argues further that this rigid militarized education “implanted jingoistic ideas in the
populace” and pushed Japan towards war.

179 

Neither parents nor the teachers had the
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ability to control their child’s education under the “centralized control of the Ministry of
Education.”

180 

Therefore, he says, it was all but impossible to teach students to “think

rationally about society.”

181 

Sato Rokuro, a former fourth grade student in Japan in

1943, recalls that his class was broken into ranks just like in the military; those in the
lower ranks had to salute those in the higher ranks, and if they did not obey they could
182 

be demoted in rank.

Primary school, he writes, was “a training ground” for future

soldiers; those who were physically weak did poorly.

183 

Even good grades on grammar

and arithmetic tests did not guarantee success, and students also needed good grades
in “moral teachings.”

184 

Ienaga’s observations, widely substantiated by accounts of

former wartime students such as Sato Rokuro reveal issues with wartime
standardization and centralization of the system and of its ability to serve as a conduit
for nationalism.
Before the Occupation released education directives to the Japanese, the
Ministry of Education unilaterally prohibited military training in schools, dismissed all
military officers on school staffs, removed equipment used for the training, and
developed plans to reeducate teachers beginning October 3, 1945.

185 

Despite the

Ministry of Education’s efforts to appeal to MacArthur before he issued specific
directions, the General Headquarters Civil Information and Education Section (CI & E)
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felt that the Ministry of Education was unable to understand democracy and unwilling to
186

embrace it.

On October 13, 1945, the Minister of Education Maeda Tamon was ordered by
Occupation authorities to make new changes to the structure of the Ministry in what
would become the precursor to more detailed future plans.

187 

Changes included:

1. A new Bureau of School Education, to carry out reforms in elementary
and secondary education.
2. A new Bureau of Textbooks, to rewrite textbooks.
3. A new Bureau of Social Education, to cultivate the moral sense of the
Japanese people and to improve national culture.
4. Abolition of the old bureau of Moral and School Education, which
preached blind loyalty.
5. Abolition of the old Institute of Research in Racial Characteristics and
the Seminary of Moral Training, because they perpetuated racism.
6. A new Institute of Educational Investigation, for reeducating teachers
with “a strong conviction in democracy.”
7. Division of the Ministry of Education into six bureaus, to further
188
decentralization and democratization.
Thus, Minister Maeda effectively removed militarism from the schools at this point, but
did little to decentralize the education system.

189

Due to the slow progress made by the Ministry of Education, in March 1946, The
United States Education Mission was sent by the State Department to Japan to aid
SCAP; its recommendations became the blueprint for SCAP’s comprehensive education
reforms.

190 

The mission was composed of twentyseven prominent American academics

and chaired by Dr. George D. Stoddard, who would later serve as President of the
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191 

University of Illinois.

Historian Kazuo Kawai points out that the mission gathered

much of their information about Japan from GHQ education officers under MacArthur's
command; thus, he suggests, many of the report’s proposed recommendations were
192

likely mere endorsements of preprepared SCAP proposals.

What the report calls “a revision of courses of instruction and of textbooks” as
well as the “purging of vicious elements in the teaching profession” was actually in full
193 

motion even before the Education Mission began.

Following Japan’s surrender on

August 15, 1945, school textbooks were quickly altered to remove militaristic phrases.
The Japanese government mandated that schools begin the “blackening over”
(
suminuru
) textbooks even before American troops had set foot in Japan.

194 

Schools

were directed by order of the Ministry of Education to “ink over or cut out those
inappropriate parts of the text.”

195 

Writing to the 
Asahi Shimbun
in 1986, former 5th

grade teacher Kawamura Fusako, sixtyfive (f), recalled that they notified teachers in
Japan to “ink out the following parts in Japanese language, Japanese history, and
geography textbooks so that they cannot be read.”

196 

These sections included parts of

the curriculum that emphasized honoring the state and that supported Japan’s “belief in
victory.”

197

She, along with her colleagues, decided to burn all “valuable historic

photographs, rare books, and documents depicting the Ise Shrine” that hung in the
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198 

teacher’s room and library.

She felt “angry and wretched,” but also felt that she could

199

not resist.

The primary focus of the report was on the decentralization. In one section, “The
Aims and Content of Japanese Education,” the report claims that a highly centralized
educational system, even if not caught under the influence of “ultranationalism and
200

militarism...is endangered by the evils that accompany an entrenched bureaucracy.”

Decentralization was seen as necessary so that teachers could develop professionally
201

without regimentation and in turn develop their students into “free Japanese citizens.”
In order to decentralize the education system and achieve democratization,

MacArthur chiefly targeted the textbook system. The control of textbooks was therefore
202 

“promptly” taken out of the control of the Ministry of Education.

In his memoirs,

MacArthur wrote that “a free people can exist only without regimentation of thought.”

203

He privatized the textbook system, putting the Japanese publishing industry on “a
competitive basis” for “the first time” and tasked them with the “preparation and printing
of the textbooks.”

204 

According to MacArthur, while the Occupation did not force specific

texts upon Japanese schools, it did require them to be free of “previous militaristic,
ultranationalistic propaganda.”

205 

As a result, MacArthur stated that it must have been

the first time in several generations that Japanese students studied from textbooks that
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were “primarily educational.”

206 

General MacArthur estimates that in the first few years

of the educational reforms, around 250,000,000 new textbooks were distributed.

207

MacArthur also wrote that he wanted Japanese teachers to have “complete
academic freedom,” as uncensored textbooks would have been “little value” without
“uncensored teachers.”

208 

In his directive to the Ministry of Education, MacArthur

ordered that all teachers and education officials who had been “dismissed, suspended,
or forced to resign” for “liberal or antimilitaristic opinions or activities” be immediately
declared eligible for reappointment.

209 

Further, he directed that discrimination against

any student, teacher or education official based on “race, nationality, creed, political
210

opinion, or social position” was prohibited.”

After the new education system had “been in effect for some time,” Occupation
authorities tested the effects of the reforms.

211 

In his autobiography, MacArthur called

the results, which he claimed were “a complete reorientation” in “the outlook” of
Japanese children, “extremely gratifying.”

212 

For example, MacArthur recalled that in a

society that had been completely militaristic years before, most Japanese school
children in the Occupation’s sampling were now interested in being professionals; out of
hundreds of students surveyed, only one expressed interest in an “army or navy
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213 

career,” and that student “wanted to be General MacArthur.”

If we are to believe

General MacArthur, then the educational reforms were a complete success.
However, after the Occupation, several important changes were made to the
education system by conservatives in the Japanese Government. The Yoshida Cabinet,
which held power during most of the Occupation years, was responsible in many ways
for the success and failures of reform efforts. Yoshida Shigeru held the position of Prime
Minister from May 22, 1946 – May 24, 1947 as the leader of the Liberal Party, and then
again from October 15, 1948 – December 10, 1954 as the leader of DemocraticLiberal
Party [which in 1950 merged again with the liberal party].

214 

The Yoshida Government

“acquiesced” in some of the “momentous changes” to the education system but resisted
215 

in other areas, according to Japanese historian Takamae Eiji.

The conservatives

objected to the creation of independent boards of education and succeeded in
postponing their full introduction until October 1952, after Japan had regained
independence.

216

Writing critically about teachers newfound autonomy, former leader of the Liberal
Party, Yoshida Shigeru, recalled in 1973 that: “Japan seemed to have an increasing
number of teachers who did not appear to have any idea what education was about and
217 

was intended to accomplish.”

Teachers, he said, now tended to pamper their students
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and submit to their juvenile views, which these teachers believed was progressive;
teachers did this instead of encouraging students to form their own opinions rather than
accept the latest fashionable view.

218 

Yoshida expected teachers to educate young

Japanese as the future citizenry of the country first and foremost.

219 

Patriotism and

reverence for the Throne were widespread values of Japanese before the war, he
wrote. According to Yoshida, replacing these wartime values with the new and
unfamiliar values of democratic education left an education that lacked the same degree
of meaning, and purpose, for Japanese.

220

Yoshida recalled that social conditions and “particularly the education issue” had
taken a turn for the worse.

221 

At the same time, little had been accomplished towards

reconstruction of the country from the effects of war, he said.

222 

Yoshida placed much of

the blame for this deterioration on unions, in the case of education, the teachers’
unions. The nation, he said, had become prey to “destructive Communistic tendencies,”
which led to mounting labor troubles and strife.

223 

Of concern to Yoshida were
224

numerous instances of primary school teachers and students going on strike.

Teachers’ unions originally formed with the support and encouragement of the
Occupation. For example, the Japanese Association of University Professors was
formed in 1946 and by 1951 had more than 5,200 members in 92 public and private
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225 

universities.

Their intended purpose as an organization was to defend academic

freedom; during October of 1949, the Association issued an “unambiguous definition of
academic freedom,” which GHQ would later undermine as part of its Red Purge. In the
public school system, teachers formed the AllJapan Teachers’ Union to improve
working conditions for teachers and to speed the democratization of schools.

226

While GHQ originally encouraged the formation of unions, the international
U.S.led battle against communism soon led to a reversal of some important Occupation
reforms to education. In a 
New York Times
article from February of 1949, titled “Japan
Told to Oust Red School Cells” shows that the Occupation began to support efforts,
similar to those taken by militarists in the 1920s, to rid Japan’s universities of communist
227 

cells.

A spokesman for the Civil Education Section of GHQ, Captain Paul T. Dupell,

criticized certain communist teachers for making converts out of disgruntled students
and other teachers; “they have become so obnoxious,” he said, “they have to be
228 

discharged for incompetence and undesirability.”

He indicated that the Occupation

would support, “without limit,” schools that summoned police to remove discharged
229 

teachers who returned to “arouse students.”

This statement shows a clear deviation

from the original goals of democratization of schools; if teachers were too leftleaning in
1949, they could be fired.
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In 1954, purportedly in an effort to counter these perceived threats, Yoshida’s
Cabinet introduced two laws. One of these laws prohibited teachers engaged in
230 

compulsory education from taking part in political activities.

The second law banned

all “overt” political education forced on teachers by the teachers’ unions.

231 

These laws

essentially banned all political activity by public school teachers both during and after
232 

school hours, with the exception of voting.

Yoshida recalls that these bills were met

with “violent opposition” from the minority in the Diet, the teachers’ unions, and certain
233 

elements of the press.

Despite efforts to obstruct their passage, however, the bills

were ratified in May of 1954.

234

In a 
New York Times
article from September of 1955, The Japan Teachers’
Union was reported to have been preparing to fight government plans to bring school
textbooks once again under the control of the Ministry of Education.

235 

Government

officials charged that many teachers, who at the time had the freedom to select
236 

textbooks for their classes, chose books containing “proCommunist material.”

Kiyoshi

Okachi, Deputy Secretary General of the union, warned that the government move
threatened to bring about a return to Japan’s prewar system in which the Ministry of
Education held absolute control over teaching procedures.

237 

Prime Minister Ichiro
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Hatayama and the Democratic Party had earlier released a pamphlet that concerned
the union and its leadership. The pamphlet, which was distributed to prefectural
education committees and parentteachers associations, called the teachers’
238 

organization a “hotbed of communism.”

It added “the textbooks with distorted

educational contents are the result of efforts by the Japan Communist Party and the
Japan Teachers’ Union to Communize textbooks.”

239 

Such efforts by conservatives in

the Japanese Government to target teachers’ unions have shown how influential the
unions were in combating centralized control.
In 1956, under Prime Minister Hatoyama’s Cabinet, elected local school boards
were effectively abolished by the Local Educational Administration Law; thereafter, local
school boards were appointed by mayors and school superintendents were appointed
by prefectural boards, which now controlled the hiring and firing process for local
teachers.

240 

According to historian Takemae Eiji, these superintendents, chosen by

prefectural and municipal boards, undermined local prerogatives; the boards ratified
decisions made by higher ups and used their indirect power to set local education
241 

policy.

The Ministry of Education regained limited centralized power in the form of
242 

“advice, guidance, and consent” to the appointed officials.

While this new system was

markedly different than the prewar system of direct control, it did take Japan’s education
system closer to centralized control. At the time the law was passed, there was
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widespread popular anger at the changes; in 1956, 500 police had to enter the Upper
House of the Diet to restrain angry lawmakers roiled up by the efforts at centralization.
243

And then in 1958, the Ministry of Education began to further reassert control over
the textbook censoring process. Through its conservative advisory body, the Textbook
Review Council, the Ministry has since 1958 censored and purged proposed textbooks
244 

considered harmful to Japan’s selfimage.

Textbook screening had originally served

as a tool for purging textbooks of militarist ideology, but is now used to whitewash texts
with perceived antiJapanese sentiments. As a result of the Ministry of Education’s
efforts to recentralize the curriculum, they have faced outspoken criticism and staunch
245

resistance from the Japan Teachers’ Union (
Nikkyouso
).

In the years after the Occupation, historian Saburo Ienaga has fought against
continued efforts by the state to shape the content of education in local schools. After
Ienaga’s revised edition of his 
Shin Nihonshi
textbook in 1955, the Ministry of Education
(MOE) requested he make 216 edits; finally the book was published in 1956.

246 

New

guidelines were issued by the MOE soon after and it took him until 1958 to gain
247 

approval for a further revised copy, which was eventually published in 1959.

Finally, a

revised 1962 textbook was rejected by the MOE, which disclosed only 20 reasons
(despite there being 323 items altogether); he made those revisions and the book was
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then approved if he agreed to change 293 items; after again completing the requested
revisions, this book was approved and published.

248 

These cases convinced Ienaga that

the textbook screening by the Ministry of education was a form of censorship.

249

In 1965, Ienaga sued the Ministry of Education for excising more than 300
passages from a textbook he had submitted for review.

250 

While some legal scholars

and publishers’ unions worried at first that Ienaga’s suit was risky, Ienaga received
massive support from the Japan Teachers’ Union, the Publishing Workers’ Union, many
individual teachers, scholars, and publishers’ staff.

251 

The suit was filed on the premise

that the state screening of textbooks was unconstitutional as it violated freedom of
expression and scholarship and ran contrary to the Fundamental Education Law [an
Occupation reform].

252 

The case stalled after the state appealed Ienaga’s request to
253 

disclose key documents explaining its objections to his textbooks.

The Tokyo District

Court handed him a partial victory in 1974, ruling that the Ministry of Education had
abused its power on 11 specific items out of the 293 that Ienaga had contested; but at
the same time it affirmed the state’s right to regulate the content of education.

254 

Ienaga

appealed.
In the mid1980s, Ienaga was in the midst of three course cases at once, all
255 

moving towards the Supreme Court.
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256 

1993, the Supreme Court dismissed his first case after a 28 year battle.

In 1989, the

Tokyo District court ruled, in Ienaga’s third lawsuit, that censors had been wrong in
censoring part of a textbook he had written.

257 

While the court upheld the government’s

right to review school texts and dictate course content, it also allowed Ienaga’s inclusion
of the Nanjing Massacre and other wartime atrocities.

258 

The rulings reveal that the

Japanese people, especially those in teachers’ unions, widely disapprove of efforts to
recentralize the education system, but that the Japanese government and the
Japanese courts continue to push centralization as legitimate.
In 1946, Dr. George D. Stoddard, Chair of The United States Education Mission,
wrote that he had been impressed with the “cultural resources of the Japanese,” their
“will to move on,” and their willingness to face the demands of democracy “unfearfully.”
259

In 2014, rankings released by education firm Pearson placed Japan in second place
260 

globally behind South Korea in terms of the best education systems.

The education

systems at the top of the list included those with “strong culture[s] of accountability” as
261 

well as “engagement among a broad community of stakeholders.”

These traits were,

in many ways, what the Occupation’s reformers sought to craft from Japan’s postwar
education system.
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Even though the Japanese government has regained much of its influence in the
school systems as a result of appointing local school boards and superintendents, these
structures are much different and much more susceptible to opposition than the system
of direct authoritarian control of the Ministry of Education during the war years.
Textbooks, while increasingly censored by the Ministry of Education beginning in 1955,
are still published independently. And while Ienaga has been largely unsuccessful in
challenging the State’s right to review school textbooks before they are published, he
has been successful in disputing some redactions made to his work. This also would not
have been possible during the war years. His case also reveals widespread support for
decentralized curriculums as he has received sympathy and interest from large
segments of Japanese society. Another important legacy of the Occupation’s education
reforms was the teachers’ unions. Teachers still retain much greater levels of
independence than they had before the Occupation and the unions continue to voice
powerful opposition to Government efforts to recentralize education. In addition, Japan
is a flourishing democracy with high civic participation. As the Pearson survey from
2014 shows, Japan’s education system, a system built by the Occupation, is successful
in large part due to widespread support from the Japanese people. If we return to the
original purposes of the Occupation education reforms, to rid the country of militarism
and help build a successful democratic system, the education reforms were a success.
Despite the influence of conservative forces in the government, there still exists a strong
opposition to militarism owing in part to the postwar curriculum that continues today.

57

Chapter III: Article IX
On September 18, 2015, the upper chamber of Japan’s Diet approved
controversial bills allowing its military to engage in overseas combat in limited
circumstances.

262 

These sweeping changes will potentially undermine over 70 years of

pacifism that resulted from postwar Occupation reforms undertaken by the Allied
powers. Much of the current debate, over the Liberal Democratic Party’s actions to shift
Japan from a pacifist nation to one capable of waging overseas war, ignores the long
process by which Japan has regained much of its military prowess. Article IX of Japan’s
constitution, which bans Japan from possessing a military, faced large challenges after
independence, however, it has remained unamended 70 years later, and furthermore,
during this time Japan has not fought a war. I will argue that the Article IX was
successful because of widespread popular support that continues through this day. To
gauge the success of Article IX, we must examine if its purpose and structure of has
remained in place.
On July 26, 1945, President Harry S. Truman, Chinese President Chiang
KaiShek, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued the Potsdam Declaration
outlining the terms of Japan’s imminent surrender. The Declaration called for: the
removal from authority of Japanese leaders responsible for leading Japan into
imperialist war; a continued Allied Occupation until Japan proved its “warmaking
power” was destroyed; the disarmament of all Japanese military forces and
demobilization to civilian life; “stern justice” would be meted out to all war criminals;
262
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Occupying forces would be withdrawn from Japan as soon as demilitarization and
democratization took place; [and] the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed
forces the alternative of which would be “prompt and utter destruction.”

263 

On August 14,

1945, Emperor Hirohito decided that the Potsdam Declaration must be accepted and on
August 15, Japan formally capitulated to Allied forces.

264 

Reflecting on Article IX of the

Japanese Constitution, General MacArthur claims he was “convinced” that it was the
“most moral of ideas” and that it was “exactly what the Allies wanted at that time for
Japan...they had said so at Potsdam and they had said so afterwards.”

265 

While

MacArthur wrote in 1964 that Article IX complied with the wishes of the Occupation to
rid Japan of militarism, he may in his writing have overlooked the distinctly Japanese
edits to its wording.
MacArthur recalled in 1964 that the problem of demobilization and disarmament
of Japanese forces became the Occupation’s “immediate objective” as soon as the
266 

surrender ceremonies were completed.

On September 2, 1945, Japanese military

forces numbered 6,983,000 troops, consisting of 154 army divisions, 136 brigades, and
20 important navy units spread from Manchuria, to the Solomon Islands, to the islands
267 

of the central and southwest Pacific.
Japan’s home Islands alone.

There were 2,576,000 Japanese soldiers on

268 

MacArthur asserted in 1964 that demobilization of
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269 

Japan’s “war machine” was tasked to the Japanese Army and Navy Ministers.

While

General Headquarters, the Eighth Army, and the U.S. Navy helped supervise and
coordinate the demobilization and disarmament efforts, it was the Japanese
“themselves who performed the task.”

270 

Once demobilization and disarmament was

complete, GHQ set about planning what Japan’s future would look like in a new
constitution.
The constitutional basis for Japan’s renunciation of armed forces was
promulgated on November 3, 1946 as Article IX in the Japanese Constitution. At the
time Article IX was introduced to the Japanese Diet, many Diet members voiced
concern that it was pledging Japan to be unarmed state in a dangerous world.

271

However, some significant changes were made to the article’s wording before it was
passed in the Japanese Diet. While the basic integrity of the law was maintained, the
new wording allowed later debate over and changes to the status of Japanese military
strength. Article IX of the Constitution of Japan reads as follows:
Article IX.
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state
272
will not be recognized.
Historian John Dower argues in his book, 
Embracing Defeat
, that revisions to the
original wording of Article IX made by a small group in the Japanese Diet before
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passage of the Constitution created ambiguity that may have intentionally left Japan
open to rearmament.

273 

The wording of the original version of Article IX was as follows:

War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is forever
renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations. The maintenance of
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized. The
274
right of the belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
So what was changed? Dower points out the importance of several changes in wording
made by former Hitoshi Ashida then a Diet member (and later Prime Minister) and
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill for Revision of the Imperial Constitution, the
Japanese body tasked with reviewing the new constitution. These changes in wording,
known as the Ashida amendment, included “maintenance of international peace” as the
objective of the article; and changes that included the wording, “In order to accomplish
275 

the aim of the preceding paragraph,” “war potential” will never be maintained.

While

the original version of Article IX began with its focus on forever renouncing war as a
means of settling disputes with other nations, the Ashida amendment instead began by
focusing on international peace as its focus. Ashida’s version reads that “war potential”
will not be maintained, however unlike the original version it does not say that limited
military forces cannot be authorized. This change, says Dower, allows proponents of
military forces in Japan to argue that Japan can possess limited military forces as long
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as they are incapable of waging a war of aggression thereby disturbing international
276

peace.

As quoted in a 
New York Times
article from 1953, former Prime Minister Hitoshi
Ashida took credit for changes made to Article IX before it was promulgated. He argued
that Japan had the right to arm itself in matters of selfdefense. Japan, he said, could
“assume her responsibilities of joint defense” with other free nations of the world without
the need for a constitutional amendment.

277 

He argues further that Japan’s peace

clause, by 1953, was no longer a matter of international debate because the 1951
Peace Treaty had recognized Japan’s “inherent right of individual and collective
selfdefense.”

278 

This argument is important because many politicians on Japan’s far

right have used Ashida’s very same argument to legally justify rearming Japan even
without officially amending the constitution.
In thinking of Article IX’s success, another way to look at it, despite changes to its
wording, is how it was embraced by ordinary Japanese. Article IX has remained
unamended since promulgated nearly seven decades ago, despite mounting efforts to
amend it. In his memoirs published in 1964, General MacArthur credits former Prime
Minister Kijūrō Shidehara for suggesting the idea that would become Article IX. He
claims that during an appointment with Shidehara, Shidehara thanked him for bringing
penicillin to Japan, which had helped the Prime Minister recover from a severe illness;
directly afterwards, MacArthur claims, he proposed that the new constitution include
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“the socalled nowar clause.”

279 

The Prime Minister, MacArthur said, wanted to “prohibit

any military establishment” for Japan.

280

In doing so, the old military party would be

deprived its instrument to seize power, and it would send a message to the world that
281 

Japan “never intended to wage war again.”

MacArthur also adds that Shidehara

believed Japan was a poor country and that whatever resources it had left should put
towards “bolstering the economy.”

282

The exact origins of Article IX are unclear, however scholars, politicians, and
researchers have strongly suggested that General MacArthur himself may have been
responsible. In the context of today’s debates about revising the constitution, many feel
that it is important to know to what degree Japanese input was involved in the March
6th draft constitution.

283 

What is clear is that Shidehara was “profoundly enthusiastic”

about introducing reforms demilitarizing Japan, but he did not believe strongly in
achieving those goals through constitutional reform.

284 

In an interview conducted in the

1992 documentary series 
Pacific Century
, Richard Poole, a former member of GHQ’s
Government Section, and one of the drafters of Japan’s new constitution, revealed that
while drafting the constitution, he expressed worries on including Article IX, which he
feared would face opposition from the Japanese, to Colonel Charles Kades. In response
Poole recalled, Charles Kades Responded, “Poole, do you know where that draft comes
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from? The General. Need I say anything more?” “No sir” replied Poole.

285 

Why would

MacArthur attempt to credit the Japanese with creating the nowar clause? The
evidence supports the theory that MacArthur wanted to make the initiative for Article IX
look like it was coming from the Japanese so that it would prove more popular. While it
is unlikely that MacArthur would have attempted to convince members of the Japanese
Diet of the authenticity of the clause, perhaps he intended to influence the Japanese
people instead.
However, historian Toshio Nishi further argues that MacArthur’s “belated attempt”
to deny his close association with Article IX was due to Cold War backtracking which
286 

might have been a source of embarrassment for him.

Speaking about Article IX’s later

interpretation, MacArthur claimed that nothing in it “prevents any and all necessary
287 

steps for the preservation of the safety of the nation.”

If Japan is attacked, “she will

288 

defend herself.”
aggression.

Article IX, he wrote, was aimed “entirely” at eliminating Japanese

289 

As the Cold War intensified and communist forces gained control of

China, the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb, MacArthur ordered the creation
of a National Police Reserve, the force that would later become the SelfDefense
Forces and whose existence potentially poses a constitutional threat in violation of
290 

Article IX.

To continue to argue for the legitimacy of Article IX and ensure its ultimate
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success, MacArthur needed to come to terms with present day realities. Either
explanation for why MacArthur credited the Japanese takes into account his desire for
the reforms to prove successful.
Regardless of who originated Article IX, it has received staunch support from
those in the Japanese Government just as it has received criticism from conservatives.
Former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru stated in 1950 that “The right of selfdefense in
291 

Japan’s case” is the right of selfdefense without resorting to “arms.”

Speaking to the

House of Councilors later that month, Yoshida added that if lawmakers held onto the
idea of protecting the country with weapons, then “we ourselves will impede the security
292 

of Japan.”

293

Further, true security lay in “earning the confidence of other nations.”

While Dower argues that Yoshida surely wished to hasten the end of the Occupation
and expedite Japan’s reacceptance into the international community, he also points out
that Article IX “possessed a compelling psychological attraction” to the Japanese people
who were sick of war and “burdened by the knowledge” that the world still viewed them
294 

as “inherently militaristic.”

If Dower’s interpretation of the Japanese people’s desires

is correct, and I suspect there is a great deal of truth to his argument, Article IX was not
something simply thrust upon the Japanese. Not only did the Diet pass it into law, but a
Conservative Prime Minister later defended its pacifist intentions.
To understand the Cold War threat to Japan, we should first look at Soviet
actions directly after the War in the Pacific ended. Writing in 1964, General Douglas
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MacArthur recalled that Russia “commenced to make trouble from the very beginning.”
295

He recalled that Russia demanded that its troops should occupy Hokkaido and that

Russian forces would be independent of the authority of the Supreme Commander.

296

General Kuzma Derevyanko at first threatened that the USSR would move into
Hokkaido without MacArthur’s permission, but MacArthur threatened to “throw the entire
Russian Mission, including himself, into jail” after which the plans were dropped.

297

On March 19, 1947, MacArthur announced at a press conference that a Peace
Treaty with Japan might soon be in the works, and that Japan might be ready to regain
298 

sovereignty.

When asked who would protect the Japanese, MacArthur stated that

Japan might need to backtrack and establish a small military, but that it would also rely
upon “the advanced spirituality of the world” to protect them against foreign aggression.
299

At the time a Peace Treaty was being considered, the U.S. government, especially

the Department of Defense, pushed back against MacArthur’s suggestion for a pacifist
300 

Japan.

Japan was widely considered the “most important nation, strategically and

economically” in Asia.

301 

Underlying the public announcements was a topsecret debate

between MacArthur, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense over the
positives and negatives of authorizing limited Japanese rearmament in the peace
302

treaty.
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In his memoirs published in 1964, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who held the
office of Prime Minister from 1946 to 1947 and from 1948 to 1954, offered his own
sentiments on rearmament directly after the war and his thoughts on the sentiments of
the Japanese people. Yoshida claimed that during his time in office, he consistently
opposed rearmament, and said that on no occasion did he contemplate taking such a
step.

303 

304

The idea of rearmament, he said, always seemed to be “verging on idiocy.”

Japan, unlike the United States, was not a wealthy country and could not afford a large
military, even proportional to its wealth.

305 

Yoshida blamed politicians for conjuring the

idea in the first place, and he felt they threw it around without understanding the subject,
and they did not understand that it could never be done.

306 

Yoshida said that what would

stop rearmament was not only Japan’s lack of wealth; Japan’s people lacked the
“psychological background,” the desire of the people, to rearm.

307 

This he attributed to

the vivid war memories that Japanese still possessed, the memories of miseries and
destruction, and, he said, “they want none of it again.”

308

In 1951, the original U.S.Japan Mutual Security Treaty was signed alongside the
Treaty of San Francisco, the second of which ended World War II and granted Japan
independence.

309 

The Mutual Security Treaty was a tenyear, renewable military

agreement that outlined a security arrangement between Japan and the U.S. in light of

303
304
305
306
307
308
309

Shigeru, 
The Yoshida Memoirs
, 191.
Shigeru, 
The Yoshida Memoirs
, 191.
Shigeru, 
The Yoshida Memoirs
, 192.
Shigeru, 
The Yoshida Memoirs
, 192.
Shigeru, 
The Yoshida Memoirs
, 192.
Shigeru, 
The Yoshida Memoirs
, 192.
Beina Xu, "The U.S.Japan Security Alliance." Council on Foreign Relations (July 1, 2014).

67

310 

Article IX.

In essence, the treaty granted the United States the right to operate military
311

bases in Japan in exchange for a U.S. guarantee to defend Japan if it was attacked.
Beina Xu, a writer at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that the security treaty

dovetailed with the Yoshida Doctrine a strategy for postwar Japan developed by former
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru that called for Japan to rely greatly on the United
States for its security needs while it focused resources on its own economic recovery.

312

In May and June of 1960, Japan was rocked by massive protests, some of the
largest in its history, in response to the revised security treaty between the U.S. and
313 

Japan.

Ratified on June 23, 1960, it committed the United States to come to Japan’s

aid in the event Japan was attacked and it provided bases and ports for U.S. forces in
314 

Japan.

The revised agreement, termed “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

between the United States of America and Japan” faced a different climate than its
predecessor. In what have become known as the “
Anpo
” protests, hundreds of
thousands of people demonstrated on the streets each day, ten million signed petitions
315

against the treaty, thousands were injured, and one person was killed.

In an interview in 2010, Yuichi Yoshikawa, 79, a veteran peace campaigner, said
that opposition to the renewed security agreement arose “as we still had vivid memories
of World War II, which had ended only 15 years (earlier), and believed the treaty would
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lead to another war.”

316 

While the protests started with relatively small numbers,

numbers soon swelled, revealing widespread “antiwar sentiment stirred also by the
outbreak of the Korean War and the launch of the SelfDefense Forces in the 1950s”
added Yoshikawa.

317 

In addition, the nuclear brinkmanship of the 1950s caused

massive anxiety throughout Japanese society and as a result, support for neutrality as
opposed to an alliance with the United States, grew stronger during the prerenewal
period.

318 

Polls taken in 1950 showed that among those Japanese polled, 22%

supported neutrality while 55% supported the U.S.Japan alliance; by 1959 those
numbers were 50% and 26% respectively, while by 1960, 59% supported neutrality and
only 14% supported the U.S.Japan alliance.

319

These numbers reveal that while very little opposition arose in response to the
original Mutual Security Treaty signed in 1951, pacifism had evidently taken hold in
Japan by the end of the 1950s. By 1960, even the prospect of getting dragged into a
war through an alliance with the United States was unpalatable for a majority of
Japanese citizens. The 
Anpo
protests were so large in scale that they forced President
Dwight D. Eisenhower to cancel his planned visit to Japan, and opposition to the treaty
ended up toppling Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke who had pushed the bill through the
Diet.

320

Perhaps the most effective way to measure the success of Article IX in Japan is
to examine the public’s acceptance and embracement of pacifism. While calls from the
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conservatives to strengthen Japan’s military, such as those by Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe, come often, protest and backlash against such a move equally constant. In
response to the 
Asahi
newspaper’s request in 1986 that readers reflect on their wartime
experiences, four thousand readers wrote in with their experiences.

321 

Among these

letters were many that denounced war and expressed strong support for Japan’s
postWar path of pacifism. While some readers tried to explain their own wartime
misdoings or support for the war, most every reader agreed that war had been an
incredibly bad thing for Japan, economically, morally, and spiritually.
One reader, Sakuraba Mieko, fiftysix (f), in 1986, reflected that her son, home
322 

from college, told her of a new field called “peace studies” being taught in college.

In

reply to her son, Mieko replied, “Now that’s more like it! I think it’s wonderful to have
323 

“peace studies.””

While we can by no means take Mieko’s enthusiasm and apply it to

all Japanese, it certainly reflects a new mindset among Japanese. Not only did her
son’s college create a field for peace studies, but also Mieko thought it important
enough to write to the 
Asahi Shimbun
about. While foreign media often publicizes
controversial visits by members of Japan’s Diet to 
Yasukuni
Shrine, it regularly fails to
publicize popular resistance to symbols of militarism.
Asahi Shimbun
reader Kojima Yuki, fourteen (f), wrote, in 1986, of the widely
prevalent resistance to the rising sun flag seen in Okinawa. She hoped this hatred
toward militarism would push Okinawans, who experienced such horrors during the war,
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to fight future militarism.

324 

On top of these hopes, Yuki took great pride in the

Constitution and reforms, which she believed had contributed to a lifestyle more
“affluent than it was during the war;” in addition, she expressed a strong desire to “etch”
into her heart the horrors of war and to help Japan progress toward peace thereby
aiding in the “progress of mankind.”

325

Another reader, Mogi Yoshio, sixtyeight (m), a former principal in Japan,
expressed guilt, in 1986, for contributing to militaristic education. He recognizes the
huge “switch in values” embodied in the new Constitution, but calls on all Japanese to
take pride in it and resist anything that infringes upon it, in order to prevent future war.

326

War, he says, is “a horrible act” that “suppresses the conscience and thought” of a
people, and “tramples” on their “basic human rights.”

327

This new pacifist identity receives criticism from Japan’s far right because they
see a new, more effeminate Japan, unwilling to hold its place in a dangerous world.
However, to other Japanese, their pacifist identity is a matter of pride. Kawaguchi Ikuo,
sixtyone (m), took pride in Japan’s new Constitution when he wrote to the 
Asahi
Shimbun
in 1986. Japan, he said, will not be able to abolish war by opposing it alone,
328

but policies could be adopted that would prevent Japan from “growing close to war.”

Keeping military expenditures low was one such measure; and Japan, he said, should
be proud of the diversion of such expenditures toward international economic
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329 

assistance and cultural exchanges.

While some, he recognized, see the Constitution

merely as “an idealistic daydream,” it had allowed Japan to rise to its “present state of
economic prosperity.”

330 

Even if Japan were to amend Article IX, the difference between

modern day Japan and pre1945 Japan is that Japan’s population, resistant to
militarism, is vocal, can vote, and the government has checks and balances in place to
prevent a handful of powerful men from sending the country on imperialist forays.
In addition to popular opinion, pacifism is also an official foreign policy position of
the Japanese government in the way it distributes foreign aid. Starting in 1990, the
Japanese government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, released
an Official Development Assistance (ODA) charter that included an objective of nuclear
nonproliferation.

331 

In making aid decisions, lawmakers would consider: “(1) trends in

military expenditures; (2) the development and production of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles; (3) exports or imports of arms; and (4) democratization efforts,
the development of marketoriented economies, and the status of human rights and
332 

freedom.”

As the world’s “largest donor of aid,” Japan is defining an important role in
333 

international nonproliferation through the manipulation of foreign aid.

And thus it
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occupies a vital role in the international community in encouraging peace and human
rights.
In March 2016, 
The Japan Times
covered current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
efforts to amend Article IX. Abe has said openly that he hopes to pass a constitutional
amendment to Article IX while he is still in office; his term as the Liberal Democratic
334 

Party’s leader ends in September 2018.

He hopes to alter Article IX to allow the Self

Defense Forces, which he says have had the public’s support since 1954, greater
capabilities and to allow Japan to come to the aid of allies even when Japan does not
face a direct threat of attack.

335 

Abe’s remarks have drawn criticism from fellow

members of the LDP and its coalition partner, the Komeito party; they worry that efforts
to amend Article IX will alienate voters and unite the opposition parties ahead of this
336 

summer’s Upper House elections.

Abe himself acknowledges that revising Article IX
337 

does not yet have popular support in Japan.

He says he will focus on making

changes to the constitution starting with less controversial subjects, such as granting
the prime minister emergency powers in times of crisis such as natural disasters or
338

direct attacks on Japan, before he focuses on amending Article IX.

Article IX of Japan’s constitution has faced large challenges after independence,
however, it has remained unamended 70 years later, and furthermore, during this time
Japan has not fought a war. As the renewal of the Mutual Security Agreement between
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Japan and the United States came to a vote in the Japanese Diet in 1960, huge
protests rocked the capital city of Tokyo, revealing an intense desire among the
Japanese people to prevent being drawn into another war. And while conservative
forces in the Japanese Government, such as current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
continue to push to amend Article IX, widespread popular support still stands against
them.

74

Conclusion
Writing in his memoir, 
Reminiscences
, in 1964, MacArthur reflected that among
his goals for the Occupation, had been to: “destroy the military power…punish war
criminals…build the structure of representative government…modernize the
constitution…establish a free labor movement…encourage free economy…liberalize
339 

education…decentralize political power.”

These tasks had occupied him for more than

five years until the end of the Occupation in 1952. All of these reforms, he wrote, were
“eventually accomplished, some easily, some with difficulty.”

340 

The goals of the

occupation, put simply, were to demilitarize and democratize Japan. However, while
MacArthur claimed absolute success, scholars with expertise on the Occupation
reforms disagree on the success of each reform. Japan is not the country it once was
and it owes a large deal of credit to the United States Occupation for shaping the new
laws and institutions of the postWar era. The Japanese people too deserve credit for
their resilient spirit and dedication to rebuilding a country devastated by war. The three
major reforms focused on in this work, the reform of the 
zaibatsu
, reform of the
education system, and Article IX, have faced very different fates despite all three
undergoing intense undermining pressure by conservatives in the U.S. and Japan
beginning in the late 1940s. As I have shown, what separated success from failure were
the differing levels of widespread popular support, in Japan and in the United States,
which each reform received. Let us briefly examine where each reform stands today.
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The debate over whether to reform Japan’s 
zaibatsu
had arisen from the debate
over whether they unfairly restricted economic activity and the free market in Japan.
MacArthur and his staff believed that a democratic Japan would be a Japan free from
the influence of powerful business leaders. Complying with President Truman’s
directive, MacArthur and his staff immediately set out to dissolve the 
zaibatsu
and to
remove their toplevel executives from power. As the Japanese economy continued to
struggle through 1947 and 1948, and as Japan’s increasingly leftists labor movement
grew, conservatives in Japan and the United states mounted a successful campaign in
the United States media and in Congress to halt the reforms. Worried that Japan was
venerable to communist takeover, conservatives in both countries pushed for economic
stabilization over democratization.
In 1948, the United States officially withdrew its support for anti
zaibatsu
policies
and instead began to encourage Japan’s Government to once again support big
business. Beginning in June of 1950, with the onset of the Korean War, the successors
of Japan’s 
zaibatsu
, such as Mitsubishi Shoji (Mitsubishi Corporation), led Japan’s
economy down a path to growth and prosperity unrivaled in history. These successors,
known as the 
keiretsu
, have since retained their privileged place in the Japanese
economy and in Japanese politics. The Toshiba scandal in 2015 has once again
brought light to the close and compromising relationships between government and big
business in Japan that the Occupation reforms had attempted to severe. In the end, the
reversal in 
zaibatsu
reforms undermined both their structure and purpose. And while

76

Japan’s economy stabilized and has prospered, the Occupation’s reform of the 
zaibatsu
failed.
Japan’s education system had served as a notorious tool for indoctrinating young
Japanese into the principles of nationalism and had inarguably helped fuel militarism up
to and during World War II. Because education served as a means of shaping Japanese
political and cultural values from a young age, it was an essential target for reform in the
creation of a new democracy. Not only was subject matter democratized, but the
administration of schools was also democratized and decentralized to prevent control by
national political parties, the Ministry of Education, or special interest groups.
Efforts by conservatives in the Japanese government, beginning in the 1950s, to
recentralize control under the Ministry of Education, such as implementing increased
censoring of school textbooks, have challenged the reforms greatly. So too have
conservatives’ efforts to undermine the teachers’ unions, a successful legacy of the
reforms, which continue to fight recentralization. However, despite these challenges,
widespread support still exists for decentralized education and free, often pacifist,
curriculums. Teachers, with support of the unions, still retain much greater levels of
independence than they had before the occupation. And while the Ministry of Education
continues to increasingly censor what it sees as antiJapanese sentiments in textbooks,
Ienaga’s lawsuits show widespread support across Japanese society to fight this trend.
In addition, Japan is a flourishing democracy with high civic participation. If we return to
the original purposes of the Occupation education reforms, to rid the country of
militarism and help build a successful democratic system, the education reforms were a
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success. While their structure has been somewhat altered in place, their purpose
remains in place. As the Pearson survey from 2014 shows, Japan’s education system is
successful in large part due to widespread support from the Japanese people. Despite
the influence of conservative forces in the government, there still exists in Japan a
strong opposition to militarism owing in part to the postWar curriculum that continues
today.
Article IX of Japan’s constitution has proven to be one the Occupation’s most
successful reforms. While it has faced large challenges after independence, it has
remained unamended 70 years later, and furthermore during this time Japan has not
fought a war. As the renewal of the Mutual Security Agreement between Japan and the
United States came to a vote in the Japanese Diet in 1960, huge protests rocked the
capital city of Tokyo. The protests revealed an intense desire among the Japanese
people to avoid being drawn into another war. Since 1954, the growth of Japan’s Self
Defense Forces has caused concern among many Japanese; however, it remains a
nonaggressive and defensive force with limited size and limited capabilities. And while
conservative forces in the Japanese Government, such as current Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe, continue to push to amend Article IX in order to grant greater strength and
greater capabilities for the Self Defense Force, the efforts have so far been
unsuccessful. Both the structure and purpose of Article IX have remained intact. And
even Shinzo Abe, who has led recent efforts to amend Article IX, publically recognizes
that the Japanese people widely support it. As the Japanese people continue to
embrace pacifism, the legacy of Article IX is one of success.
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